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of the next of kin, is an insult to the family right to have its dead
rest inviolate. The voucher for the reality of the injury may be
found in the mutilation or disturbing of the dead body. Since the
injury is in its essence an injury to the family honor or dignity,
it would follow that the recovery must depend upon the degree of
the relationship. -W. F. B.
JOINT WRONGDOERs-DISTINCTION BETWEEN JOINT TORTFEASORS
AND CONTRIBUTORS TO INJURY.-The defendant was one of several
independent upper riparian owners, refuse from whose mines de-
stroyed the value of plaintiff's property in such a way that it was
very difficult to prove how much of the damage was done by each.
Held, the independent owners are not jointly liable, nor is ony one
of them liable for such damages in their entirety. Farley v. Crys-
tal Coal & Coke Co., 102 S. E. 265 (W. Va. 1920).
The decision in the principal case is supported by the great
weight of authority in this country. Pulaski Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Gibboney Sand Bar Co., 110 Va. 444, 66 S. E. 73; Little Scityl-
kill Navigation, Railroad & Coal Co. v. Richard's Admr., 57 Pa.
St. 142. The decisions generally rest on the theory that the wrong
done, upon which the right of action arises, is throwing refuse into
the stream. This is in every sense a separate wrong, and torts
originally several cannot be made joint because their consequences
afterwards become blended and united with each other. Little
Schuylkill Navigation, Railroad & Coal Co. v. Richard's
Admr., supra; Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co. et aZ., 111
Tenn. 430, 78 S. W. 93. The chief obstacle in such cases is the prac-
tical impossibility of assessing damages with any degree of certain-
ty, In a similar case the Ohio court held that the jury could not
reach their verdict by ascertaining the amount of the whole dam-
age, and dividing it by the number contributing thereto. Upson
Coal & Mining Co. v. Willianis, 75 Oh. St. 644, 80 N. E. 1134, 22
L. R. A. N. S. 283n. Most courts hold that the relative proportion
of refuse thrown in by each may form some guide, and that a jury
in case of such difficulty caused by the defendant himself, should
measure the injury with a liberal hand. Little Schuylkill Naviga-
tion, Railroad & Coal Co. v. French, 813 Pa. St. 366; Swain v.
Tennessee Copper Co., supra. The court in the latter case inti-
mates that in such cases the court would be slow to interfere with
damages supposed to be excessive. Such a method of assessing
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damages largely does away with the main objection to the principal
case, viz., the plaintiff's difficulty of obtaining adequate relief.
-M. T. V.
EQUITY-PROCEDURE-DEPOSITIONS IN EQUITY MAY BE TAKEN
AFTER CAUSE HAS MATURED AND IN ADVANCE oF ANSWER.-In a
suit to set aside an alleged sale of some coal properties, an exception
was taken to the reading of certain depositions taken on behalf of
the plaintiff before the filing of the answers. The ground of such
exception was that the depositions were prematurely taken. Held,
that there is no merit in this objection. Tierney v. United Poca-
hwntas Co. et al., 102 S. E. 249 (W. Va. 1920).
Under some statutes and in chancery under special circumstances,
depositions may be taken de bene esse after service of process; and
before an answer has been filed; and in special cases before the
return of the writ or the appearance of the defendant. Harding
v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 55 N. E. 577; Amory v.
Fellowes, 5 Mass. 219; Mumford v. Church, 1 Johns. Cas. 147
(N. Y.) ; Southtwell v. Limerick, 9 Mod. 133, 88 Eng. Reprint 360;
Gilpin v. Semple, 1 Dall. 251 (Pa.). Under the chancery practice
as to depositions in chief, and under some statutes, the cause must
be at issue before depositions can be taken. This is the strict com-
mon-law rule. Karaway v. Kentucky Ref. Co., 163 Fed. 189; Hen-
derson v. Hall, 134 Ala. 455, 32 So. 840; S. C. Hall Lumber Co. v.
Gustin, 54 Mlich. 624, 20 N. W. 616; Gardner v. Roycrofters, 103
N. Y. Supp. 637; Barnsley v. Powell, 3 Atk. 593, 66 Eng. Reprint
1142. In West Virginia there is a rule which prohibits the taking
of a deposition to prove a matter before it is pleaded. Egdefl v.
Smith, 50 W. Va. 426, 40 S. E. 402; Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 46
W. Va. 426, 33 S. E. 266. But the West Virginia courts seem to
look at the pleading rather than the issue, and say that there is no
practice forbidding the plaintiff to support the allegations of his
complaint, by proof, even before they are denied. James v. Piggot,
70 W. Va. 435, 74 S. E. 667.
-A. W. L.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-CONTROL BY STATES-REGULATION OF
INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL GAS Am ELECTRICITY.-An
electric plant generated electricity in Virginia and transmitted the
electric current directly to consumers in West Virginia. The West
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1921], Art. 18
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss2/18
